

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 087786

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TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC, NPG

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT ON NUNN NUCLEAR REPORT

REFS: A. USNATO 2023; B. STATE 57131

HOLD FOR OPENING OF BUSINESS.

1. YOU SHOULD INFORM ALLIES THAT IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST
BY SENATOR NUNN WE HAVE PREPARED AN UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY
OF THE FULL REPORT TO CONGRESS. YOU SHOULD PROVIDE ALLIES
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 087786

WITH TEXT (PARA 4 BELOW) AND SEEK AGREEMENT FOLLOWING
PROCEDURES WHICH YOU RECOMMENDED IN PARA 1 REF A. YOU
SHOULD ALSO INFORM ALLIES THAT WE ARE PREPARING AN
UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF FULL REPORT AT THE REQUEST OF

SENATOR STENNIS, CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A COPY EARLY NEXT WEEK FOR MISSION REVIEW AND VIEWS ON CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES.

2. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT THAT UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF SUMMARY AND FULL REPORT WILL FORM BASIS FOR UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENTS BY USG REPS IN CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS WHICH WE EXPECT WILL BE CALLED.

3. TEXT OF UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT USNATO RECOMMENDATIONS (PARA 2 REF A) BUT DIFFERS IN SOME RESPECTS, NOTABLY TREATMENT OF POLITICAL SIGNALING AND REDUCTIONS. YOU SHOULD RESPOND TO QUESTIONS REGARDING THEM AS FOLLOWS: (A) POLITICAL SIGNALING: WE BELIEVE UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY SHOULD NOT IGNORE POLITICAL SIGNALING ROLE OF THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HOWEVER, TREATMENT OF POLITICAL SIGNALING (AS IN SUMMARY IN REF B CIRCULATED TO ALLIES) SEPARATE FROM OTHER OPTIONS COULD LEAD PRESS AND OTHERS ERRONEOUSLY TO EQUATE POLITICAL SIGNALING WITH LOW NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. FOR THIS REASON WE INCLUDED BRIEF REFERENCE TO DEMONSTRATION OF NATO'S RESOLVE IN SENTENCE TREATING RANGE OF ATTACK OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO (LAST TICK IN SECTION ON USE OF TACNUCS). YOU MAY ASSURE ALLIES THAT POLITICAL SIGNALING FORMULATION CONTAINED IN REF B REMAINS UNCHANGED IN APPROPRIATE SECTION OF FULL CLASSIFIED REPORT GIVEN TO CONGRESS. (B) REDUCTIONS: IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOT PREJUDICED, WE HAVE DELETED ALL STATEMENTS INDICATING THAT REDUCTIONS OF US THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE MAY TAKE PLACE. SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO MBFR WAS ALSO DELETED IN ORDER TO AVOID GENERATING PUBLIC SPECULATION THAT US NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAY BE INTRODUCED INTO MBFR. CLASSIFIED STATEMENTS ON REDUCTIONS AND MBFR CONTAINED IN REF B SUMMARY AND IN FULL REPORT REMAIN OF COURSE UNCHANGED.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PROPOSED UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 087786

THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT (PARAGRAPH HEADINGS INDICATE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RAISED IN PL 93-365)

THE OVERALL CONCEPT FOR USE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. HOW THE USE OF SUCH WEAPONS RELATES TO DETERRENCE AND TO A STRONG CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE.

NATO'S MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF DETERRING ARMED ATTACKS BY THE WARSAW PACT (WP) ON THE NATO ALLIES. IF DETERRENCE FAILS, THESE FORCES SHOULD BE ABLE TO DENY THE ENEMY'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND

TERMINATE THE CONFLICT QUICKLY, AT THE LOWEST LEVEL
OF VIOLENCE CONSISTENT WITH NATO'S OBJECTIVES.

-- ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS REQUIRES:

- THE CLEAR CAPABILITY TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY AT ANY LEVEL OF CONFLICT THREATENED BY THE WP.
- A COHESIVE ALLIANCE, RESOLVED TO FIGHT AS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ITS MEMBER NATIONS.

-- THE WP HAS A LARGE NUMBER OF THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES WHICH ARE GENERALLY STRUCTURED FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO. WHILE WP STRATEGISTS MAY ACCEPT THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONVENTIONAL WAR, WP FORCES ARE IN FACT POSTURED AND TRAINED FOR COMBINED CONVENTIONAL-NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, WITH LARGE ARMORED FORCES TO EXPLOIT WP NUCLEAR STRIKES BY RAPID PENETRATIONS DEEP INTO NATO TERRITORY.

-- NATO MAINTAINS A TRIAD OF FORCES TO OPPOSE THE WP THREAT:

- CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DETER AND DEFEND AGAINST CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 087786

- THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES TO DETER AND DEFEND AGAINST THEATER NUCLEAR ATTACKS; HELP DETER AND, IF NECESSARY, ASSIST IN DEFENSE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS; AND HELP DETER CONFLICT ESCALATION.

- STRATEGIC FORCES TO DETER AND DEFEND IN GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR; DETER CONFLICT ESCALATION; AND REINFORCE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IF NEEDED.

-- NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES DETER WP NUCLEAR ATTACKS IN EUROPE BY PROVIDING A CREDIBLE CAPABILITY TO RETALIATE. THIS DETERRENT IS MOST EFFECTIVE IF THE NATO NUCLEAR FORCES CAN SURVIVE NUCLEAR ATTACKS AND, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SURVIVING CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BLUNT SUBSEQUENT WP ARMORED ATTACKS AND THREATEN OTHER WP TARGETS OF VALUE, THUS CHANGING THE PERCEPTIONS OF WP LEADERS REGARDING EARLY AND EASY VICTORY. THIS SHOULD CREATE A SITUATION MORE CONDUCIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND TERMINATION OF THE CONFLICT.

-- THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ALSO HEDGE AGAINST UNEXPECTED FAILURE OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

AGAINST WP CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, THUS ENHANCING THE OVERALL DETERRENT PROVIDED BY THE NATOTRIAD. THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN THIS CASE SHOULD BE EMPLOYABLE WITH SELECTIVITY AND CONTROL. THE STRONGER NATO'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES, THE LESS LIKELY WILL BE THE NEED TO USE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO AVOID CONVENTIONAL DEFEAT. STRONG CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE.

-- ANY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY EITHER NATO OR WP, HOWEVER LIMITED, CARRIES RISKS OF FURTHER ESCALATION. NEVERTHELESS, IN THE FACE OF A WP NUCLEAR STRIKE OR OVERWHELMING CONVENTIONAL ATTACK, US AND NATO LEADERS WOULD USE WHATEVER FORCE IS NECESSARY TO DEFEND THE ALLIANCE. A SURVIVABLE, EFFECTIVE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE HELPS TO DETER WP AGGRESSION AND, IF NUCLEAR RESPONSES ARE NECESSARY, PROVIDES ATTACK
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 087786

OPTIONS WHICH HAVE PROSPECTS OF SHOWING NATO'S RESOLVE AND OF LIMITING THE CONFLICT, THUS FACILITATING

NEGOTIATIONS AND AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, RATHER THAN FURTHER NUCLEAR ESCALATION OR ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR.

REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS WHICH ARE NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DEFENSE STRUCTURE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

-- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES REMAIN FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A CREDIBLE NATO DEFENSE POSTURE.

-- US AND NATO STUDIES ARE EXAMINING THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS IN THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. THESE STUDIES ARE CLASSIFIED.

-- THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES HAVE, SINCE 1972, BEEN PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORED OVERSEAS.

STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO DEVELOP A RATIONAL AND COORDINATED NUCLEAR POSTURE BY THE NATO ALLIANCE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH PROPER EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE FORCES.

-- NATO HAS A NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND POSTURE WHICH HAS EVOLVED IN A COORDINATED WAY TOWARDS RATIONAL GOALS.

IN VIEW OF CHANGING THREATS AND NATO MILITARY CAPABILITIES, IT IS NECESSARY THAT NATO'S NUCLEAR POSTURE CONTINUE TO EVOLVE. NATO IS PURSUING IMPROVEMENTS THROUGH SUCH ORGANIZATIONS AS THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) AND THE PLANNING ACTIVITIES OF SACEUR'S MILITARY STAFF.

-- NATO MUST CONTINUE TO IMPROVE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN DETERRENCE AND RAISE THE
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 087786

NUCLEAR THRESHOLD. THE NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS ARE AGREED THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES ARE THE WEAKEST LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD AND MUST CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN PRIORITY FOR IMPROVEMENTS. A LARGE NUMBER OF ACTIONS ARE UNDERWAY TO THIS END.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS MUST BE MADE IN THE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, AS SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON FEBRUARY 5, 1975:

- FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN SURVIVABILITY UNDER CONVENTIONAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACKS.
- IMPROVED COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITIES.
- IMPROVED TARGET ACQUISITION CAPABILITIES.
- CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS FOR LIMITED USE TO COMPLEMENT CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AND HELP CREATE A SITUATION CONDUCIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND EARLY WAR TERMINATION.
- IMPROVEMENTS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE.

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